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III this article, Lee provides guidance for Treasury 
and the IRS (ilt their promised clarification of applica-
tion of INDOPCQ). He delineates how to avoid what ... 
he perceives as the past pitfalls of capitalization of 
recurring, insubstantial, or relatively short-lived ex-
penditures with Ito, or inadequate, amortization. The 
article also sets forth models for (a) amortizing as. a 
freestanding deferred charge long-lived substantial 
self-created intangibles such as business expansion 
costs, including employee training cosls, and (b) ex, 
pensing, or perhaps better, amortizing currently less 
substantial or regularly recurring, steady state self-
created intangibles (such as repairs and advertising, .. 
respectively). 
This article is derived from a chapter on 
"Capitalization" ill a manusc'ript for a textbook on ". 
"Taxation of Capital Transactions" currently in 
preparatioll by Professor Lee and Gene Seago, R.B . ... 
Pamplin Professor of Accounting, Virginia Poly tech- . 
Ilic Institute and State University. . 
..... ": .. 
Copyright © 1992, John W. Lee and W. Eugene Seago ... ;., ' 
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TAX NOTES, November 2, 1992 
DOPING OUT THE 
CAPITALIZATION RULES 
AFTER/NDOpeO 
by John W. Lee 
The words of Koheleth son of David, King in 
Jerusalem. 
Only that shall happen 
Which has happened, 
Only that shall occur 
Which has occurred; 
There is nothing new 
Beneath the sun! 
Sometimes there is a phenomenon of which they say, 
"Look, this one is new" - it occurred long since, in 
ages that went before us. The earlier ones are not 
remembered; so, too, those that will occur later will no 
more be remembered than those that will occur at the 
very end . 
(Ecclesiastes Chapter 1, Verses 9 through 11 (Tanach, 
a new translation of the Holy Scriptures according to 
the traditional Hebrew text).) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As we all know now, the Supreme Court in INDOP-
CO, Inc. v. Comm 'rl at long last rejected the "separate 
saleable asset" doctrine under which expenditures 
with substantial future benefits could be currently 
deducted so long as they did not create or enhance a 
separate asset. The Tax Executives Institute (TEl) 
charged that IJIRS field agents have been running wild, 
using the ruling to deny all manner of deductions."2 
TEl was concerned about challenges to the deduct-
ibility of advertising, employee training, and repair 
and maintenance expenses,3 all of which often provide 
future as well as current benefits. Fortunately, the Ser-
vice plans to address the application of INDOPCO to 
1112 S. Ct. 1039 (Feb. 26, 1992). 
2Zeidner, "Treasury-IRS Business Plan Wins Praise," 92 
Tax Notes Today 112-4 (May 29, 1992) (quoting Tim Mc-
Cormally, Tax Counsel for Tax Executives Institute) . 
3u TEI Warns of IRS Agents Poised To Disallow Historically 
Deductible Expenses," 92 Tax Notes Today 97-26 (May 7,1992). 
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these items before year end under its "1992 Business 
P lan."4 Service representatives have correctly stated 
that the Supreme Court did not change the longtime 
s tandards for d istinguishing currently deductible ex-
penses from capital expenditures except to overrule the 
"separate saleable asset" doctrine.s And in Rev. Rul. 
92-80,6 the Service, with scant analysis of such stan-
dards, concluded that INDOPCO "does not affect the 
treatment of advertising costs as business expenses 
which are generally deductible under section 162 .... " 
I The Supreme Court in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r at long last rejected the 'separate saleable asset' doctrine. 
This article reviews those standards and makes 
recommendations as to administrative guidelines for 
post-INDOPCO resolution of current deduct-
i bili ty / ca pi taliza ti on -cum -amortiza tion of expendi-
tures with present and future benefits. The most im-
portant lessons in this area over the past 25 years or so 
are: (1) If an expenditure by a new business, such as 
e mployee training, provides fu ture benefits for a 
shorter period than the life of the business, its plant, 
or operating permit, the capitalized expendi ture 
should not be added to the basis of the business, plant, 
or permit, but instead should be treated as a freestand-
ing self-created intangible amortizable over the shorter 
period benefitted (where section 195 does not apply); 
4Avakian-Martin, "INDOPCO Guidance Likely To Cover 
Advertising, Repairs, Training," 56 Tax Notes 545 (Aug. 3, 
1992). The Treasury-IRS "Business Plan 1991," electronically 
reproduced, 92 Tax Notes Today 104-50 (May 15,1992), identified 
broad subject matter areas and specific topics, including under 
the subject of tax accounting, "Guidance on INDOPCO," 
where the Office of Tax Policy of the Treasury Department and 
the IRS intend to provide gUidance before the end of 1992. 
5 Avakian-Martin, "IRS To Move Carefully in Releasing 
INDOPCO Guidance," 92 Tax Notes Today 152-3 Guly 27, 
1992). INDOPCO in essence merely held that the reading of 
Lincoln Savings as establishing "creation or enhancement of 
an asset" as a prerequisite to capitalization was incorrect. 
Lincoln Savings stands for the simple proposition 
that a taxpayer's expenditure that "serves to create or 
enhance ... a separate and distinct" asset should be 
capita lized under section 263. It by no means follows, 
however, that only expenditures that create or enhance 
separate and distinct assets are to be capitalized under 
section 263 . .. . 
Nor does our statement in Lincoln Savings . .. that 
"the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some 
future aspect is not controlling" prohibit reliance on' 
future benefit as a means of distinguishing an ordinary 
business expense from a capital expenditure. Although 
the mere presence of an incidental future benefit -
"some future aspect" - may not warrant capitalization, 
a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in 
which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably im-
portant in determining whether the appropria te tax 
treatment is immediate deduction or capitalization. IN-
DOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1044-45 (footnotes omitted). 
61992-39 I.R.B. 7 (Sept. 1992). 
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(2) if an expenditure, such as advertising, provides 
current and fu ture benefits and is regularly incurred in 
roughly the same amount year-aFter-year, or almost 
every year, i t should be currently deductible if 
capitaliz ing and a m ortizing would be burdensome; 
and (3) if an expenditure, such as repa irs, provides 
current and future benefits but is not subs tantial in 
comparison to total replacement cost of the repaired 
item, it should be currently deductible. Not only are 
these "rough justice" approaches supported by more 
than mere straws in the wind in the existing case law 
(and commentary), but ignoring them brought about 
the widespread adoption of the separate asset doctrine 
in the first place. 
II. PURPOSE OF CAPITALIZATION 
The purpose of capitalization under section 263 (and 
the resulting basis increase under section 1016)1 is largely 
timing: to "prevent a taxpayer from uti lizing currently 
a ded uction p roperly attributable, through am ortiza-
tion, to later tax years when the capital assets become 
income producing."B The same p urpose is also effected 
by the "ordinary" expense requirement of sec tion 162,9 
and the "clear-refl ection-of-income" requirement of 
section 446. In sho rt, the function of the capitaliza tion 
requirement coupled w ith amortization is to avoid dis-
tor tion of income. 
7Sections 263(a)(1) and (a}(2), respectively, prohibit a cur-
rent deduction under sections 162 or 212 for (a) any amount 
paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements 
made to increase the value of any property, and (b) any 
amount expended in restoring property or in making good its 
exhaustion for which a depreciation, amortization, or deple-
tion allowance is or has been made. Treas. Reg. section 
1.263(a)-1 (a)(2). Section 1016(a)(1 }(a) adjusts a property's basis 
upward for the cost of capital improvements and similar items 
chargeable to capital account. If the property is used in a trade 
or business or held for investment, such adjusted basis may 
then be "recovered" through: (a) depreciation or amortization 
over the property's useful life, if subject to exhaustion through 
use in the taxpayer's business or section 212 income-produc-
ing activity; or (b) deduction from the amount realized in 
computing gain or loss under section 1001 upon a subsequent 
sale or other taxable disposition of the property. 
8Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. I, 16 (1973); 
accord, INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1042-43. 
The primary effect of characterizing a payment as 
either a business expense or a capital expenditure con-
cerns the timing of the taxpayer's cost recovery. While 
business expenses are currently deductible, a capital 
expenditure usually is amortized and depreciated over 
the life of the relevant asset, or where no specific asset 
or useful life can be ascertained, is deducted upon 
dissolution of the enterprise. .. Sections 167(a) and 
336(a); Treas. Reg. section 1.176(a) . .. Through 
provisions such as these, the Code endeavors to match 
expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to 
which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting 
in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax 
purposes. 
95ee, Comm ', v. Tellier, 383 U.s. 687,689-90 (1966). 
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III. BLACK LETTER RULES 
A. One-Year Rule of Thumb 
Early cases frequently required capitalization be-
cause the benefits of the expenditure lasted longer than 
the yearly accounting period .lO This doctrin~ resulted 
in the classic definition of a capital expenditure as a 
cost securing an advantage to the taxpayer that has a 
life of more than one year. l1 Otherwise, capital expen-
ditures were deductible under this rationale if the use-
ful life of the property was less than one yearY More 
recently, the one-year rule of thumb has been properly 
viewed as "intended to serve as a mere guidepost for 
the resolution of the ultimate issue, not as an absolute 
rule requiring the automatic capitalization of every 
expend iture providing the taxpayer with the benefit 
enduring for a period in excess of one year. "13 But 
generally, where an expenditure provides substantial 
future benefits, current deduction understates the 
taxpayer's current income and overstates future in-
come. J4 
I The function of the capitalization requirement coupled with amortization is to avoid distortion of income. 
Exceptions to future benefit capitalization make the 
rule. Distortion of income should be the lodestar, not 
merely future benefit. Misfocus on future benefit alone 
led some courts to describe the exceptions permitting 
current deduction of expenditures providing current and 
future benefits (such as repair, educational costs, or a 
sales salary) as due to "considerations of expediency"J5 
or "considerations of pragmatism and uncertainty."16 
JOSee, e.g., W.B. Harbeson Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 24 B.T.A. 
542,550 (1931); see generally, Note, "Income Tax Accounting: 
Business Expense or Capital Outlay," 46 Harv. L. Rev. 669 
(1934). 
II See United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742 (10th Cir. 1957), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958); accord, Fall River Gas Appliance 
Co. v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 515 (lst Cir. 1965). 
12Helvering v. Kansas City American Ass'n Baseball Co., 70 
F.2d 600,604 (8th Cir. 1935); Nachman v. Comm'r, 12 T.c. 1204, 
1207 n.1 (1949), aff'd, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951). See Treas. 
Reg. section 1.263(a)-2(a). 
J3Ullited States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968); 
accord, Sears Oil Co. v. Comm'" 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966). See 
generally, Lee & Murphy, "Capital Expenditures: A Result in 
Search of a Rationale," 15 U. Richmond L. Rev. 473, 477-78 
(1981). 
JWCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 961 (4th Cir. 
1981) ("NCNB n. rev'd and remanded, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 
1982) (en banc) ("NCNB l/") . NCNB II was overruled by IN-
DOPCO. Whether this overruling of NCNB II resurrects 
NCNB I may be a determinative factor in the future evolu~on 
of case law and administrative guidelines on expense/capItal 
expenditure and amortization. 
IsFishman v. Comlll'" 837 F.2d 309, 311 (7th Cir. 1988) (Pos-
ner, J.); accord, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. Comm'r, 685 F.2d 
212,217 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.). 
16NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961; id. at 962 ("not-worth-the-
trouble exception"). 
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Such "analysis" appeared inspired by the Supreme 
Court's noting in Comm'r v. Lincoln Savings & Loan 
Ass'n17 that the presence of an ensuing future benefit was 
not controlling because many concededly deductible ex-
penses have prospective effect beyond the tax year. 
The real problem with the future benefits test in prac-
tice was the tendency to add the capitalized cost of, say, 
employee training in a new business .to th~ basis of a 
nonamortizable asset such as the busmess Itself or an 
indefinite life permit. For example, in the leading pre-
section 195 start-up cost decision, Richmond Television 
Corp. v. Ullited States,I8 the contested start-up costs con-
sisted largely of broadcasting staff training expenses, 
primarily expenses of training a staff for two years (to 
operate a television broadcasting station) incurred prior 
to receipt of an FCC TV broadcasting license and, hence, 
commencement of commercial TV broadcasting. The 
government primarily argued that the training of the 
broadcasting staff created a capital asset in the form of a 
reservoir of skills with continuing benefits over the 
period of years. Consequently, charging against the first 
year's income the large outlays required to acquire the 
staff would produce a gross distortion of the taxable 
income for that year.19 The Fourth Circuit accepted the 
government's creation of a capital asset benefitting future 
years and distortion-of-income argument as an alterna-
tive holding.20 The Supreme Court remanded for con-
17403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971) (The court did not enumerate any 
such deductible future benefit expenditures). Lincoln Savings 
& Loan considered the deductibility of a payment by an S&L 
to a reserve fund held by a federal agency. In deciding whether 
the payment was a contribution to an asset or an expense, the 
court said: 
What is important and controUing, we feel is that 
the ... payment serves to create or enhance for Lincoln 
what is essentially a separate and distinct additional 
asset and that, as an inevitable consequence, the pay-
ment is capital in nature and not an expense, let alone 
an ordinary expense, deductible under section 
162(a) ... . 
403 U.S. at 354. While concluding that the contribution to 
the reserve fund was capital, the court specifically rejected 
the argument that the expenditure was not deductible simply 
because it had an effect beyond one year. 
18345 F.2d 901, 905-07 (4th Cir.), vacated and ,emanded per 
curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). 
19Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Richmond Television Corp. v. 
United States, supra. See generally Lee, ,. A Blend of Old Wines 
in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond," 29 Tax L. Rev. 
347. 458 (1974). And capitalizing those costs and adding them 
to the basis of a nonamortizable broadcasting license wouldn't? 
20Doubly unfortunately, Richmond Television first 
proceeded to survey several investigatory and start-up-cost 
decisions, concluding that: "The uniform teaching of these 
several cases is that, even though a taxpayer has made a firm 
decision to enter into business and over a considerable period 
of time spent money for preparation for entering that busi-
ness, he still has not 'engaged in carrying on any trade or 
business' within the intendment of section 162(a) until such 
time as the business has begun to function as a going concern 
and performed those activities for which it is organized." 345 
F.2d at 907 (footnotes omitted). Thus was born the start-up-
cost doctrine in its modem guise. 
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sideration of whether the cost added to the basis the 
. ti' bl 21 broadcasting permIt was amor za e. 
The real problem with the future 
benefits test was the tendency to add 
the capitalized cost to the basis of a 
nonamortizable asset such as the 
business itself or an indefinite life 
permit. 
Similarly, the Claims Court, in Cleveland Elec. Illu.m. 
Co. v. United States,22 added the capitalized cost of tra1O-
ing emplo-yees for a nuclear powered elect:icity 
generating plant to the basis o~ the nonamortl~able 
oRerating permit. This approach Itself produces dlstor-
ti6n of income when recurring expenditures (e.g., staff 
training expenses) are added to a nonamor.tizable asset, 
such as an indefinite-life operating permit. Moreover, 
using this approach with a new business requi.rin~ a 
license creates a conceptual quandary - how to Justify 
the current deduction of similar training costs by an 
ongoing business in expansion. (This would cause a 
fatal conceptual flaw in section 195 as drafted.B ) An 
example of this problem is allowing curr~nt deduct~on 
of staff training cos ts for a new branch 10 expand10g 
the same business, while requiring capitalization of 
start-up costs for identical s taff training for ~ new 
branch in a different location or a new busmess. 
Cleveland Electric llluminating faced precisely this prob-
lem: deductibility of employee training expenses for 
the initial work force at a new coal-fired generating 
plant similar to its existing generating plants .and. of 
training expenses for the initial work force at Its hrst 
nuclear powered generating plant. The Claims Court 
attempted to distinguish the two expenses on the 
grounds that the new business (nuclear power ge~e~at­
ing plant) start-up costs for new employee tra10mg 
21382 U.S. 68 (1965) . On remand, the Fourth Circuit found 
that the FCC broadcasting license was not amortizable be-
cause it was readily renewable. Richmond Television Corp. v. 
Unit ed States, 354 F.2d 410,412 (4th Cir. 1965). The court made 
two more errors here: (1) the pool of trained employees should 
have been treated as a freestanding amortizable intangible; 
and (2) where permit costs are recurring, they shou~d be amo~­
tized over the period between permit renewals since that IS 
the only period they benefit. 
227 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985) . 
23Mea culpa. Lee, "Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear 
Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax 
Reform, and a Touch of Basics," 6 Va. Tax Rev. 1,85-91 (1986) 
(one of my earlier articles formed the conceptua.l model for 
section 195 providing the definition in the Co~mlt~ee Report 
for investigatory and start-up costs; that article dId not ex-
amine the underlying clear reflection of income pOlicy of 
capitalization). The seminal article advocating clear reflec-
tion of income as the basis for capitalization is Gu.nn, "The 
Requirement that a Capi tal Expenditure Create or Enhance 
an Asset," 15 B.C. Indu s. & Com. L. Rev. 443 (1974) . 
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were substantial, provided future benefits, and con-
stituted a one-time expenditure. (The latter appears 
factually wrong in light of industry exper~e~ce and 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ru~es . requ.mng con-
tinuous retraining .) The court distinguished the 
employee training costs for this "n~,,:" business 
generating plant from the employee trammg costs for 
"same" business generating plan~ because the sa~e 
business (fossil fuel power generat10g plant) expansIOn 
costs for new employee training were not s? su?st~n­
tial, replacement employees at it would receive s~mllar 
training, and the employee turnover. rate was pz~oJected 
as 10 percent per year at the coal-flfed plant. In ~d­
dition, the Claims Court found that no new operat1Og 
permit was required for the new plant in the same 
business, an immediate benefit was present, and any 
division of the cost according to immediate and future 
years was thought impractical. The Claims Cour~ ~er­
mitted immediate deduction for the employee tramIng 
costs at the new coal-fired generating plant while 
capitalizing the employee training costs at the new 
nuclear-powered generating plant. 
Other employee training costs for nuclear power 
generating plant cases disclose, however, that 
employee turnover at such plants a~so is ~igh and 
employee retraining c.osts are substan~lal. For 1Ostan,c;~ 
the Tax Court in Madlsoll Gas & Electnc Co. v. Comm r 
found that 1/7 of an operator's time at an atomic 
powered generating plant subject t? the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (then the AtomiC Energy Com-
mission) is devoted to retraining of the same scope and 
extent as the original training (operators' licenses are 
good for only two years and the NRC requir.es con-
tinuous retraining); turnover at the plant was high due 
to an extremely competitive job market and "be~ause of 
physical and psychological problems resulting tram the 
pressures of the position" - the "Silkwood" factor - ; 
and 34 percent of the training expenditures over a 10-
year period were attributable to employees no longer 
employed at the end of the period .. ~iven such ~ pat-
tern, adding the initial operator trammg expe~dltures 
to the NRC license to operate the plant, which was 
indefinite and thus nonamortizable, distorted the 
taxpayer's income in Cleveland Electric. The court 
derived from Richmond Television and its progeny the 
"theory that where a business requires substantial 
start-up expenditures before it can begin ope~ations, 
which are not directly for the purchase of tangIble as-
sets and which will not ordinarily be recovered out of 
revenues for the same year, the capital investment is in 
the business as a whoie rather than merely in tangibles, 
24Why was the nuclear generating plant not merely a new 
way of carrying on the same business? See Col~rado Springs 
Nat'! Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Clr. 1974). 
2572 T.e. 521, 543-544 (1979), a/I'd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 
1980) (the capitalization and amortization issue not raised by 
the taxpayer). 
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and it includes the start-up costS."26 The Claims 
Court should have set up the "new business " 
nuclear-powered generating plant employee training 
costs (or perhaps only the excess over the average 
amount of recurring retraining and replacement 
training costs, with the latter amount currently de-
ductible) as a freestanding asset amortizable over a 
period based on projected employee turnover and 
retraining rates. The fossil fuel generating plant 
training costs similarly should have been set up as a 
separate asset amortizable, probably, over 10 yearsY 
Alternatively, both should have been currently de-
ductible if, in fact, any allocation of cost to present 
and future years was impractical. (On examinations, 
most of my students choose this option.) 
B. Origin-of-Claim 
Both Richmond Television and Cleveland Electric 
may be closer to purchased intangibles than self-
created intangibles in that both involved reimburs-
ing another entity for the employee training costs. 
Although in theory, self-created and purchased in-
tangibles as to a trained work force should be treated 
a like, 28 neither Congress29 nor the courts30 seem so 
inclined. 
Although in theory, self-created and 
purchased intangibles as to a trained 
work force should be treated alike, 
neither Congress nor the courts seem 
so inclined. 
The Supreme Court, in Woodward v. Comm'r,31 ap-
plied an "origin-of-the-claim" standard to capi talize 
litigation expenses incurred by the taxpayers pur-
suant to state law requiring shareholders voting in 
favor of a certain corporate action to purchase all of 
the stock of the "dissenters" at its then value - the 
litigation was over that value. The taxpayers argued 
that a primary-purpose test applied, under which 
capitalization was required only if the taxpayers' 
primary purpose in incurring expenditures was to 
267 Cl. Ct. a t 228. 
27Lee, 6 Va . Tax Rev. at 67-7l. 
28Mundstock, "Taxation of Business Intangible Capital," 
135 U. Pel1n. L. Rev. 1179 (1987). 
29Proposed section 197, section 4501 of H.R. 4210, lOZnd 
Con g., 2d Sess. 
3°lthaca Indus ., Inc. v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 253 (1991). 
31397 U.5. 572, 576 (1970). 
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defend or perfect title to their own stock. The 
Supreme Court disagreed.32 
The Fifth Circuit extended an origin-of-the-claim 
analysis to business expansion costs, at least where a 
separate location is acquired.33 Central Texas Savings & 
Loan Ass'n v. United States34 analyzed a state branch 
S&L permit as a "separate asset" with which it as-
sociated under the "origin-of-the-claim" rubric both 
the permit's application costs and market survey costs. 
The court denied any amortization ded uction, pointing 
out that section 195 was not yet applicable. Tested 
against a distortion of income analysis, the result in 
Central Texas Savings & Loan was partly right and partly 
wrong. The permit application costs were properly 
capitalized and added to the cost of the nonamortizable 
permit or branch (provided that the permit did not 
have to be periodically reviewed), but the survey costs 
(unless nonrecurring and used only in the acquisition 
of the new branch permit but not in its subsequent 
32 Woodward v. C01l1111'r, 397 U.S. 572, 576-78 (1970). Professor 
Gunn has suggested that the policy underlying the "origin-
of-the-claim" doctrine is that to allow a deduction for expen-
ditures integrally related for the capital asset while taxing 
related gain from the ultimate disposition of such asset as 
capital gain without a reduction for the expenditure results in 
a distortion of the character of the taxpayer's income as a 
practical effect through the allowance under the late 1954 code 
of 160-percent deduction (60-percent deduction under the late 
1954 code for capital gains and 100-percent deduction for 
expenditure). See Cunn, supra at 447 n.20; accord, Lee & Mur-
phy, supra at 484. Tn 1992, the practical effect of the deduction 
would be about 110 percent (the maximum capital gains rate 
of 28 percent vs. the maximum permanent ordinary rate of 31 
percent). Gunn's hypothesis has case-law support. For in-
stance, Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373, 
378 (Ct. Cl. 1960), held that "[e)xpenses necessarily incurred 
to realize a capital gain reduce the amount of that gain and 
partake of the nature of the gain to which they relate." The 
Court of Claims cited Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), 
which, under this reading, would require capital treatment of 
expenditures in a subsequent tax year integrally related to a 
prior capital transaction on the theory that otherwise the tax-
payer would obtain an additional tax benefit through cou-
pling an ordinary deduction with a capital gain. See also Munn 
v. United States, 455 F.2d 1028, 1033 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (if an expense 
is incurred in the process of acquisition or disposition, "the 
expenses simply take the character of the asset to which they 
relate .... " Brown v. Comm'r, 529 F.2d 609, 613 (10th Cir. 1976) 
(under Arrowsmith look at all events in the transaction and 
here payment due to section 16(b) suit is related to proceeds 
given earlier beneficial tax treatment). In United States v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970), a companion case to Wood-
ward, the court also required capitalization of expenses ariSing 
from an appraisal proceeding brought by shareholders of a 
controlled subsidiary, dissenting to its merger with the parent. 
The taxpayer had relied heavily on the fact that immediately 
upon registering their dissent, title to the shares of the dis-
senters was vested in the subsidiary, but the court could not 
see why the order of fixing price and conveying title should 
make any difference. 
33Centrai Texas S&L v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th 
Cir. 1984); cf. Cleveland Elec. IlIum. Co. v. Ul1ited States, 7 CI. 
Ct. 220, 225, 229 (1985) . 
34731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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operations) should then have been treated as a separate 
asset and currently deducted or amortized depending 
on the duration of benefits. Instead, the Fifth Circuit 
(1) talismanically applied the acquisition cost doctrine 
derived from Richmond Television and its progeny to the 
(presumably recurring and limited-life) market survey 
costs, then (2) mechanically associated them with an 
indeterminable-life asset (the permits), and thereby (3) 
precluded amortization. This recreated the no-man's-
land of distortion of income through no deduction cur-
rent or through amortization that, as discussed below, 
led to the adoption of the separate saleable asset test 
in the first place. The Supreme Court in INDOPCO 
hinted that the Fifth Circuit's opinion was on the right 
side of the conflict between the circuits over the 
separate saleable asset test.35 As discussed below, the 
proper issue is whether the "asset" in such expansion 
and similar cases is the business as a whole, the 
license/branch, or a separate "freestanding" (amor-
tizable) intangible. 
C. The Separate and Distinct Asset Doctrine 
The Lincoln Savings36 reference to future benefit as 
not controlling, and looking to whether the payment 
served to create or enhance for the taxpayer "what is 
essentially a separate and distinct additional asset," led 
to a line of cases seeking to avoid Richmond Television's 
no deduction/nor amortization distortion of income by 
granting an equally flawed immediate deduction. (This 
time, two wrongs did not make a right.) The Second 
Circuit, in Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r,37 read Lin-
coll1 Savings as effectuating a radical shift in emphasis: 
directing the inquiry from whether the benefit of the 
expenditure extended over several tax years to where 
it created or enhanced an essentially separate and dis-
tinct additional asset. This formulation of the test for 
capitalization/current deduction was strongly criti-
35See 112 S. Ct. 1042 n.3. 
36403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971). 
37375 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1973). In Briarcliff Candy, Loft's 
had previously relied on candy sales in its own retail stores, 
but their profitability had greatly declined as a result of the 
population shift to the suburbs. Loft's, therefore, expended 
substantial sums in setting up a separate "franchise" division 
and in securing multiyear contracts with independently 
operated suburban retaH outlets that agreed to carry Loft's 
candies. Reasoning that the relevant tax law was "in a state 
of hopeless confusion particularly where the issue concerns 
[the deductibility of] an intangible contribution (such as a 
salesman's work-product) to an intangible asset (such as his 
company's position in the market}," the Second Circuit 
reversed the Tax Court, which had upheld the 
commissioner's determination that the expenditures in ques-
tion should have been carried forward into, and the as-
socia ted outlays should have been spread over, tax years in 
which Loft's received the revenues from sales by the inde-
pendent retail outlets. "[I]t is incumbent on the legislative 
authorities making the statutes and the implementing regu-
lations to furnish clear standards and guidelines as to what 
intangible assets are deductible under section 162 and what 
are not." Id. 
674 
cized by Professors Gunn and Lee38 and finally over-
ruled by the Supreme Court in INDOPCO, Inc . v. 
Comm'r. 39 
Lincoln Savings led to a line of cases 
seeking to avoid Richmond 
Television's no deduction/nor 
amortization distortion of income 
by granting an equally flawed 
immediate deduction_ 
The separate and distinct asset approach was readily 
applicable where a taxpayer acquiring, for example, a 
new business,4o purchased land, vehicles, or equipment 
or constructed a new building. The real conceptual 
problem as to intangibles created in business expan-
sion (or start-up costs for that matter) was determining 
what constituted the separate asset: the business as a 
whole or a separate (amortizable) intangibleY On the 
one hand, a number of cases involved what normally 
would be ordinary and necessary business expenses 
but which were treated as part of the cost of acquisition 
of a capital asset.42 In many cases, such costs, if recur-
ring or of finite benefit, should be set up as a separate 
amortizable intangible.43 On the other hand, the 
"separate, saleable asset" precondition for capitaliza-
tion was overinclusive, permitting a current deduction 
for (1) substantial expenditures benefitting an ex-
tended period of time although creating no transferable 
asset, e.g., a computer program expected to last five 
years,44 and (2) acquisition costs of a license with an 
indefinite life.45 A current deduction in s uch instances 
produces more distortion of income than capitalization 
as a free-standing asset amortizable over the benefitted 
period. 
38Gunn, "The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure Cre-
ate or Enhance an Asset," 15 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 443 
(1974); Lee, "Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear Reflection 
of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a 
Touch of Basics," 6 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 52-57 (1986). 
39112 S. Ct. 1039 (Feb. 26, 1992). 
40Vermont Transit Co. v. Comm'r, 218 F.2d 468 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955). 
41See Gunn, supra at 446, 492; Lee, supra 6 Va . Tax Rev. at 
14,27-8,30-8. 
42See, e.g., Shain berg v. Comm'r, 33 T.e. 241 (1959) (cleaning 
expenses to prepare shopping center for grand opening and 
insurance premiums paid during construction period were 
made in connection with acquisition of a capital asset); 
Schultz v. Comm'r, 50 T.e. 688, 696 (1968) (insurance cost, 
storage charges, and taxes paid during four years aging 
period of whiskey purchased as investment were part of 
acquisition price of four-year-old whiskey). 
43Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. at 32-38. 
44For example, in First Security Bank of Idaho v. Com III , r, 592 
F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1979), the majority permitted deduction of 
the cost of a computer program lasting five years used in 
establishing a bank's credit card operation as a business ex-
pansion cost. 
45NCNB (11),684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982), en banco 
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In addition to its functional weaknesses, the 
separate, saleable asset test was weak conceptually, 
based upon a limited and oft-criticized read ing of Lin-
coln Savings. As the Claims Cou rt pointed out in 
Clevelalld Electric lIIumillating Co. v. United States, the 
"separate and distinct asset" referent in Lincoln Savings 
only meant that in the particular case before the Court 
the taxpayer's acquisition of such an asset was 
decisive.46 Furthermore, a host of examples could be 
found where capital treatment is required although no 
separate and distinct asset was created or enhanced .47 
For ins tance, start-up costs, minimum educational ex-
penses, and new (i.e., different type), job-seeking ex-
penses must be capitalized under the majority of 
authorities although arguably a separate and distinct 
asset was not acquired . 
Despite conceptual failings, prior to 
INDOPCO the 'separate saleable asset' 
doctrine enjoyed great, but not 
universal. success in the business 
expansion area. 
Despite all of these conceptual failings, prior to IN-
DOPCO, the "separate saleable asset" doctrine enjoyed 
great but not universal48 success in the business expan-
sion area. A large number of early business expansion 
cases involved establishment of credit card systems by 
banks. The decisions universally held that the credit 
card system enabled a bank to carryon an old business 
in a new way and, hence, constituted the expansion of 
an existing business rather than start-up costs of a new 
business.49 These dec isions also rejected the 
government's argument that the start-up costs of the 
credit card system were not ordinary expenses because 
they generated future economic benefits, on the basis 
of Lillcoln Savillgs,50 which they read as establishing 
iron rules that the presence of an ensuing benefit that 
may have some future aspect is not controlling; the 
question is whether a separate asset was created or en-
hanced. The bank credit card progeny of Briarcliff Candy 
found that participation in a credit card system did not 
46"lt does not state ... that if the separate and distinct asset 
test is not met the payment is a necessary and ordinary ex-
pense." Cleveland Elec., 7 CI. Ct. at 225. 
47Cunn, supra at 446, 447 n.20; Lee & Murphy, supra at 
54446. 
481 certainly would not say, as have other commentators, 
that "[w}ith only one limited exception, the other courts fol-
lowed Briarcliff Candy . .. . " Javaras & Maynes, "Business Ex-
pansion and Protection in the Post-INDOPCO World," Tax 
Notes 971, 973 (May 18, 1992). 
49See, e.g., Colorado Springs Nafl Bank v. United States, 505 
F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974); accord, First Nafl Bank of South 
Carolina v. United States, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977); Iowa-Des 
Moines Nat'l Bank v. C0Il1111'r, 68 T.e. 872 (1977), afl'd, 592 F.2d 
433 (8th Cir. 1979). 
5°403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971). 
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create a property right convertible into cash,5! and most 
of them in establishing the "separate, saleable property 
right" bright-line test for current deductibility of certain 
business expansion costs contained common elements. 
The expenses were recurring (and in Briarcliff Candy 
increased annually in amount over a long period), and 
thus were similar to many preopening expenses. 
Moreover, as Judge Posner pointed out in Encyclopedia 
Britannica, "[t]he distinction between recurring and 
nonrecurring business expenses provides a very crude 
but perhaps serviceable demarcation between those 
capital expenditures that can be feasibly capitalized 
and those that cannot be. "52 The most important com-
mon factor, however, was the view that a current 
deduction of a recurring expense with some future 
benefits was preferable to its capitalization without 
amortization - "rough justice." The Second Circuit in 
Briarcliff Candy merely charged Congress "to furnish 
clear standards and guidelines as to what intangible 
assets are deductible under section 162 and what are 
not."53 The leading bank credit card decision, Colorado 
Springs National Bank v. United States54 , however, shar-
pened the thrust: 
The start-up expenditures here challenged did 
not create a property interest. They produced 
nothing corporeal or salable. They are recurring. 
At the most they introduced a more efficient 
method of conducting an old bus iness. The 
government suggests no way in which they could 
be amortized. The government's theoretical ap-
proach ignores the practicalities of the situation, 
and permits a distortion of taxpayer's financial 
situation. If an expenditure, concededly of tem-
poral value, may be neither expensed nor amor-
tized, the adoption of technological advances is 
discouraged.55 
In summary, the first application of the separate, 
saleable asset doctrine worked well (steady-state recur-
ring expenditures). When mechanically extended, 
however, as is the nature of a bright-line test, the 
doctrine itself produced distortion of income and, in 
time, countervailing authorities,56 as well as further 
51Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 
1973). 
52Encyclopedia Britannica, Tn c. v. COll1m 'r, 685 F.2d 212, 217 
(7th Cir. 1982). 
53See Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 783. 
54505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974). 
55505 F.2d supra at 1192. Judge Posner has applied an 
economic efficiency argument to the other side of the coin 
(current deduction): 
[Ilf a member of this panel rents a safe-deposit box 
to keep his securities in, he can deduct the annual 
rental under section 21; but if he buys a safe he must 
capitalize its purchase price - he can' t just deduct the 
price from his investment income in the year of pur-
chase. Otherwise taxpayers would have an incentive 
unrelated to the efficient use of resources to buy rather 
than rent safe places for their securities. 
Fishman v. Comm'r, 837 F.2d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1988). 
56Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. at 56-57. Thus, it lost the prime 
advantage of a bright-line mechanical rule - predictability. 
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conceptua l distortions57 and inevitable conflicts in line-
drawing as to what was the same business. Some 
deci s ion s liberally determined the breadth of the 
taxpayer's existing business, while the Tax Court took 
a quite narrow approach 5H 
NCNB Co rp. v. Ullited States59 ("NCNB II" ) held that 
Lineo/II 5 & L supersed ed RiehnlOnd TV as to proper 
application of the one-yea r rule . The full Fourth Circuit 
57ln Dllffy v. Unit ed Stales, 690 F.2d S89 (Ct. Cl. 1982), the 
Court of Claims, in determining the trade or business of the 
taxpayer for purposes of the expansion of an ex i ~ ting business 
versus. start-up of a new business tes t, relied upon the fact 
that the taxpayer had "employed" two controll ed corpora-
tions to implement his own personal business of owning and 
operating a mote\, to conclude that the taxpayer had been 
engaged in the development, construction , and operation of 
hotels so that a commitment fee paid to a potential lender for 
the purpose of havi ng funds made available for construction 
of a motel cou ld not be characteri zed as a s tart-up cos t because 
the business was alread y ongoing when the expense was in-
curred. The Di stri ct Court in Baltill10re Air Coil Co. v. United 
Siales, 333 F. Supp. 705 (D. Md. 1971), allowed a parent co r-
poration to deduct groundbreaking cos ts, trainee salaries, 
travel expenses, employee moving expenses, and minor ad-
ministrative ex penses incurred in opening a subsidiary in a 
different state. The dis tri ct court reasoned that the subsidiary, 
which filed a consolidated tax return with its parent, acted as 
an agent for and on behalf of its parent, and, while informed, 
admittedl y a separate entity, in substance was but one 
enterprise with the parent. Therefore, the parent was entitled 
to deduct the expenditures paid on behalf of the subsidiary. 
COllira Benllett Paper Corp. v. Comm 'r , 78 TC 458 (1982), afl'd, 
699 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
58The leading "same" or "existing business" expansion 
decisions were found in the Fourth Circuit, which in essence 
held that all rea l estate ventures, whether residential, com-
mercial, or industrial, constituted the sa me business for pur-
poses of currently deducting sta rt-up-like business expan-
sion expenditures. SeeMallIlstedt v.Comlll .r. 578 F.2d 520 (4th 
Cir. 1978) ("i t is not the size of the undertakings but their 
similarity as business ac tivities - whether the qu estioned 
activity represents s imply the normal expansion of the ex ist-
ing business or whether it is within the 'compass' of the 
existing business - which is determinative of whether the 
questioned activity represents a new and unrelated business 
venture for purposes of applying sec tion 162."); accord York 
v. COIII/II ' r, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1955). The Eleventh Circuit 
pOinted out that the Fourth Circuit in York "never considered 
the possibility that the ex penditure might be capital in na-
ture, focUSing solely on the requirement of section 162 that 
the taxpayer be in the trade or business." Ellis Banking Corp. 
v. COIIIIll ' r, 688 F.2d 1376, 1380 n.9 (11th Cir. 1982). 
The Tax Court consis tentl y took a narrow approach as to 
rea l estate. See Sheha n v. COIl1I11'r, 29 CCH TCM. 727 (1970); 
Presau/I v. CO I11I11 ' r, 34 CC H TCM. 685 (1975); O'Doll/lell v. 
COII/TII'r, 62 TC 781 (1974) . The Tax Court took a broader 
approach outside of rea l estate as to what cons tituted the 
taxpaye r' s busi ness and ex pan sion . See, e .g., Brown v. 
COII/III'r, 39 CCH T C M. 397 (1979) (computer monitoring 
program new and more effi cient way to carryon "LD" tutor-
ing service, expenses were recurring, e.g., telephone, promo-
tion, and travel); Equitable Life 1ns. Co. of 10wa v. COII/III ' r , 336 
CCH TCM. 11 84 (1977) (recurring SEC registration expenses 
as to new annuity contract deduct ible because recurring ex-
pense of new product in old business) . 
59684 F. 2d 285, 289 nA (4 th Cir. 1982) (ell banc). 
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placed itself squarely in the camp of cases allowing ex-
penditures for the expansion of an existing bus iness, fol-
lowing Briarcliff Candy Corp. and the bank credit card 
cases. Still another reason the Fourth Circuit in NCNB Jl 
used to buttress its en banc opinion was that the panel 
opinion would have rendered section 195, providing for 
amortization of start-up costs, meaningless, for it would 
have obliterated the reference point in the s tatute of the 
expansion of an existing trade or business.6o Addition-
ally, the rehearing opinion pointed to the Suprem e 
Court's opinion in Comm 'r v. Idaho Power CO.,61 which 
s tated that where a taxpayer's generally accep ted ac-
counting method is made compulsory by a reg ulatory 
agency and clearly reflects income, it is almost presump-
tively controlling for federal income tax purposes. In 
NCNB, the banking regulatory agencies required national 
banks to charge to current operations all exp enditures 
related to the development and expansion of banking 
services, including credit card programs and, apparently, 
branching. Finally, NCNB 11 pointed out that the expen-
ditures in question were in effect recurring because the 
bank holding company's business was operating a 
statewide network of branch banks; and to m ainta in this 
network, NCNB had to constantly evaluate its market 
position through various means a nd the bank had to 
regularly open and close branches and make s imilar 
s tudies.62 To the extent that the en bane opinion in NCNB 
Jl read Lincoln Savings as providing for current deduct-
ibility whenever expenses having prospective benefit do 
not create or enhance a separate asset, it was in error. Not 
only was the particular statement dictum, but more sig-
nificantly, as discussed above, there are grounds for 
capitalization other than creation or enhancement of a 
separate capital asset. One of these is clear reflection of 
income,63 This lacuna in the en bane decision is perhaps 
most clearly exposed by the subsequent Eleventh Circuit 
opinion in Ellis Banking discussed below. More s ig-
nificantly, other cases in bank geographic expansion and 
then expansion of other businesses began to find tha t the 
new location itself or new branch constituted a sepa ra te 
a sset without a definite life, which attracted the 
capitalization of sometimes recurring expenses and thus 
produced the same distortion of income of no current 
deduction and no amortization either. 
In Ellis Banking Corp v. Comm'r,64 the ta xpaye r, a 
bank ho lding company, w a nted to expand to new 
60Congress is thus under the impression that expendi-
tures for market studies and feasibility studies, as at 
issue here, are fully deductible if incurred by an existing 
business undergoing an expanSion. An interpretation by 
us to the contrary would render section 195 meaningless 
for it would obliterate the reference point in the statute 
- "the expansion of an existing trade or business." 
NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 291. 
61418 U.S. 1 (1974). 
62684 F.2d 293-94. 
63See Gunn, "The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure 
Create or Enhance an Asset," 15 B.C. Indll s. & COI1lIll. L. Rev. 
443 (1974); Lee & Murphy, "Capital Expenditures: A Result 
in Search of a Rationale," 15 U. Richlllond L. Rev. 473 (1981). 
64688 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.s. 1207 
(1983). 
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geographic markets, but state law prohibited branch 
banking, so expansion was limited to acquiring stock 
of existing banks or organizing new banks and sub-
sidiaries. Applying the "origin of the claim" capitaliza-
tion doc trine enuncia ted by the Supreme Court in 
Woodward v. Comm'r65 and United States v. Hilton Hotel 
Corp.,66 the Eleventh Circuit held that a bank that ex-
pands to new markets by acquiring the stock of other 
banks must capita lize as an acquisition cost of the stock 
the investigation or start-up costs a ttributable to such 
expansion. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the 
anomalous result that virtually identical investigatory 
expenditures would be currently deductib le under the 
NCNB en bane decision, if incurred in expansion 
through branching rather than through purchasing ex-
isting banks and operating them as branches, but 
believed that the Fourth Circuit en bane decision was 
in error.67 
The most important common factor 
was the view that a current deduction 
of a recurring expense with some 
future benefits was preferable to its 
capitalization without amortization -
'rough justice. ' 
In summary, the business expansion cases adopted 
the separate asset doctrine because the Service sought 
to leave expansion costs in the "black hole" of per-
manent capi talization. 68 O ther courts, in reaction to the 
perceived distortion of currently deducting long-lived 
assets, then turned to the acquisition cost doctrine. The 
"golden mean" of amortizing business expansion costs 
propounded by NCNB I never caught on, probably due 
to perceived ability to pass the buck to section 195. But 
the lesson is clear: unjust rules, capitalization without 
adequate amortization, will cause some (but not all) 
courts to seek other solutions promoting uncertainty. 
The Treasury fIRS goal of "rough justice" is welcome 
and to be celebrated. 
D. Repair versus Maintenance 
Treas. Reg. section 1.162-4 provides that the cos t of 
incidenta l repairs, which neither materially add to the 
value of the property nor appreciably prolong its life, 
but keep it in an ordinari ly efficient opera ting condi-
tion, may be currently ded u cted as an expense, 
provided that the cost of acquisition or the gain or loss 
basis of the taxpayer's p lant, equipment, or other 
property is not increased by the amoun t of such expen-
ditures. Repairs in the nature of "replacements," to the 
extent that they arrest deteriora tion and apprec iab ly 
prolong the life of the property, must ei ther be capital-
b5397 u.s. 572 (1970) . 
6b397 U.s. 580 (1970). 
67688 F.2d 1380 n.7. 
68Javaras & Maynes, supra at 975. It was the same injustice 
as to start-up costs that compelled me to first begin writing 
in this area two decades ago. 
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ized and dep reciated under section 167, or charged 
against a depreciation reserve, if any. Similarly, Treas. 
Reg. sec tion 1.263(a)-1 (b) requires capitaliza tion of 
amounts (a) adding to the va lue, (b) substantially 
prolonging the useful life of the taxpayer's property, 
e.g., p lant or equipment, or (c) adapting such property 
to a new or different use. 
The repair versus improvement case law developed 
a gloss very similar to the Central Texas S&L1Clevelalld 
Electric broad capitalization approach under which the 
otherwise deductible cost of a repair is capitalized if 
the repair was part of an overall pattern of rehabili ta-
tion.69 The most sound rationale for the ge neral 
rehabilitation rule is that execution of a plan of 
rehabilitation constitutes the acquisition of a new capi-
tal asset so that all the related expenses must be capi-
talized.70 So viewed, the plan of rehabilitation ru le is 
analogous to the rule that an expenditure that is part 
of the acquisition cost of a capita l asset must be capi-
talized even though standing alone or incurred after 
the process of acquisition is complete would be deduct-
ible.71 Even so, it ignores the "separate basket" ap-
proach to allocation of purchase price and the pre-
ACRS analogy of component depreciation. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Moss v. Comm'r,n correctly 
limited the "rehabilitation doctrine" to substa ntia l 
capital improvements and repairs to the same specific 
assets (usually a structure in a state of disrepair) . In 
Moss, the taxpayer-motel capitalized "hard remodel-
ing" costs of beds, chairs, tables, and lamps, and 
depreciated them over a seven-year useful life while 
currently deducting "soft remodeling" costs for new 
carpeting, drapes, and bedspreads amounting to about 
20 percent of the cost of the hard remodel. The Service 
sought to add the costs of the "soft" remodel to the 
structure of the building and amortize them over a 
30-year useful life. The taxpayer carried out both hard 
and soft remodels of each motel room every three to 
five years on a rotating cycle so that the contested soft 
remodel costs of the newly acquired motel, which had 
been allowed to deteriorate, were only twice the usual 
annual soft remodel costs. The Ninth Circuit per-
mitted ded uction of the entire soft remodeling costs. 
This is another example of judicial overreaction to the 
Service's income-distorting adjustment. Deprecia ting 
soft remodeling costs that would be repeated in three 
to five years over 30 years would have produced over-
statement of income in the early years. But expensing 
such costs in year one surely produced understatement 
of income in year one. The fact that year one costs were 
double the average stretches the regularly recurring, 
69See United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689-90 (lOth Cir. 
1968). 
70See California Casket Co. v. Comm'r, 19 T.C 32, 37-8 (1952) 
(acquisition of building with express intention of completely 
renovating an alternate to coruorm to specific requirements of 
business required capitalization of all integral parts of plan). 
71 Wilbur's Estate v. Comm'r, 43 T.C 322, 327 n.6 (1964), acq. 
1965-2 CB. 7 (the last coat of paint in construction of a new 
building must be capitalized). See also Jones v. COI/1I/1 ·r, 24 T.C 
563 (1955), afrd, 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957). 
72831 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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steady state notion. The leas t income distorting ap-
proach would have been to capitalize the soft remodel-
ing costs and amortize them over, say, four years. (But 
again, many of my students opt for current deduction 
on examinations.) 
The rule that expenditures that materially add to the 
value of the property must be capitalized is frequently 
indivisible from the doctrine that an expenditure creating 
or enhancing a tangible asset with a useful life of more 
than one yea r must be capitalized.73 Thus, expenditures 
by a hotel for carpets, rugs, padding under carpets, 
refrigerator, rehabilitation of hea ting and plumbing and 
related work, toilet covers, cloth material, dishwasher, 
adding machine, roofing and sheet metal contracts, cook-
ing ranges, potato peeler, and tile work on kitchen walls 
and showers were capi talized because "[slome were for 
repairs of a permanent nature which materially added to 
the value of the property and appreciably prolonged its 
life as an operating hotel; and others were for replace-
ments of furnishings and equipment having a useful life 
in excess of one year."74 
Any effective repair adds to the value of the property 
as compared with its value immediately prior to the 
repair/5 Therefore, the proper view is the Tax Court's test: 
whether the expenditure materially enhances the value, 
etc., as compared with its status prior to the condition 
necessitating the expenditure?6 Use of the cheapest ex-
pedient to correct a defect in lieu of more costly replace-
ment or restoration is indicative of repalr.n The Service 
has declined to apply this test for whether the expendi-
ture increases the value where (1) the property has not 
progressively deteriorated, (2) subjective factors, such as 
an asbestos-free workplace, have to be considered in 
valuing the property after the improvement (removal of 
asbestos), and (3) compliance with local requirements 
permits cont inu ous operation within re gulatory 
guidelines.78 
The regulations require capi talization of "repairs in 
the nature of replacements" if they arrest deterioration 
and appreciably prolong the life of the property, while 
"incidental repairs" may be currently deducted?9 As a 
73See Treas. Reg. section 1.263(a)-2(a) and 1.263(a)-1(b). 
74Hotel Kinglwde v. Com m'T, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 
1950). Query implications of Moss. 
75minois MeTchant s Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 4 B.T.A. 103, 107 
(1926). 
760berman Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 47 T.e. 471,483 (1967). 
77See Hlldlow v. Comm'r, 30 T.CM. 894 (1971) (instead of 
removing existing floor and perform a complete restoration, 
taxpayer simply covered what was there by pouring in con-
crete, "which was more in the nature of a cheap, expedient, 
fix-up job, and less in the nature of a permanent and endur-
ing improvement. ... "). 
78Commentators criticized the Service's narrow reading of 
deductible repairs as not appreciably increasing the value of 
the repaired property and especially its reasonjng that be-
cause the asbestos' remova l costs created long-term benefits, 
induding "safer working condi tions for employees, reduced 
risk of liability for owners and investors, and generally, in-
creased marketability," they constituted capital expendi-
tures. Sheppard, "Is the IRS AbUSing INDOPCO? ," 56 Tax 
Notes 1110 (Aug. 31, 1992). 
7~reas. Reg. section 1.162-4. 
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practical matter, the result usually is capitalization of 
major replacement items.Bo Nevertheless, structural al-
terations sometimes are deductible.81 Generally, such 
structural expenditures are allowed where they only re-
store the property to the condition prior to the event 
causing the expenditure.82 The regulation'S use of the 
term "incidental repairs" has led often to a determination 
of whether a major portion of the property has been 
replaced.83 
Alterations adapting a building or a particular piece 
of equipment so that it can function in a different man-
ner constitute a capital improvement. 54 The rationale 
is that adaptation of a piece of equipment or an entire 
property to the taxpayer's use is analogous to his/her 
purchase of a new asset in which event the purchase 
price would have to be capitalized.85 Indeed, this ra-
tionale would often cover the rehabilitation cases 
which usually involve adapting a building to a dif-
ferent or higher use. But even so, under "component" 
depreciation such a separate, freestanding asset ap-
proach as to intangibles could be taken. (Note: "com-
ponent" amortization might not be available if the pur-
chase results in use of ACRS by the purchaser; ACRS 
prohibits the component method.) 
Most, but not all, of the problems in the repair area 
would be resolved, if the courts explici tly adopted the 
criterion that an expenditure for repair must be capital-
ized wherever it is sufficiently subs tantial in relation to 
the taxpayer's entire business and sufficiently nonrecur-
ring that to deduct it would produce distortion of his/her 
income.86 However, as a practical matter, courts to date 
have not followed this approach even though precedents 
exist, e.g., the regulation'S expensing of small tools, 
books, and furniture by professionals discussed above, 
BOE.g., Phillips & Easton Supply Co. v. Comm'r, 20 I.e. 455 
(1953); Alexander Sprunt & Son , Inc. v. Comm'r, 24 B.T.A. 599 
(1931), rev'd on other grounds, 63 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1933). 
81See Farmer's Creamery Co. v. Comm'r, 14 I.C 879 (1950) 
(replacement of less than 50 percent of deteriorated walls, 
ceilings, and floors deductible) . 
82See, e.g., Oberman Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 47 T.e. 471 (1967). 
835ee Denver & Rio Grande Western RR v. CO/ll/ll'r, 279 F.2d 
368 (10th Cir. 1960); Buckland v. United Stales, 66 F. Supp. 681, 
683 (D. Conn. 1946) (expenditures equal to 35 percent of value 
to repair leaky walls and roof deductible) . 
84Coors Porcelain Co. v. Comm'T, 52 T.C 682,696-97 (1969), 
aff'd on other issues, 429 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1970) (conversion of 
machine from oscillating to rotary action); accord West Va . 
Steel Corp. v. Comm'" 34 T.e. 851 (1960) (rewiring factory and 
adjacent storage area to rearrange equipment for more effi-
cient operation). 
85See Sloe/zing v. COnlm'" 266 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1959) (tax-
payer bought an old building and made a new and different 
building, commercially useful, out of it) . 
86Gunn, supra at 458-59; Lee and Murphy, supra at 541-43. 
I do not believe that a subjective purpose test will preva il 
here. Contra Adams & Hinderliter, "INDOPCO, Inc. v. COIII-
missioner: Impact Beyond Friendly Takeovers," 55 Tax Nol es 
93, 96, 102 (April 6, 1992). The Supreme Court expressly 
rejected a subjective purpose test for capitalization in favor 
of an objective "origin-of-the-c\aim" test in Woodward/Hilton 
Hotel, supra, decided six years after General Bancshares v. 
COIllIll'" 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1964). 
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and the more explicit recognition in Sharon v. Comm'r,87 
Cillcinnati-New Orleans & Texas Pacific RR v. United States,58 
Southland Royalty Co. v. United States,89 Encyclopedia Britan-
/lica, Inc. v. Comm'r,90 and Waldheim Realty and Investment Co. 
v. Comm'r,91 as discussed below. With the renewed emphasis 
on future benefit and attention to repairs, however, a new 
day may be dawning. In contrast, the above-noted asbes-
tos-removal TAM, in its shotgun approach, also rested on 
the permanency of the one-time asbestos removal. 
"Removal is a one-time expenditure that results in a sig-
nificant change to the property and is not remedial." 
IV. THE PROPER APPROACH 
Classic depreciation of tangible property (prior to ac-
celerated depreciation and especially ACRS) and current 
amortization of intangible property conceptually consist 
of allocating a capitalized cost (usually ratably) to the tax 
years to which it contributes to production of income, i.e., 
its useful life. Capitalization coupled with amortization 
is therefore necessary to prevent the distortion (here, un-
derstatement) of the taxpayer's net income that would 
result from deducting the entire cost currently of an ex-
penditure "properly attributable, through amortization, 
to later tax years when the capital asset becomes income-
producing." The critical question is whether current 
deduction of an expenditure benefitting future years 
will result in more than minimal distortion of income. 
If not, and the burden of capitalization and amortiza-
tion will be heavy, the expenditure should be currently 
deducted in its entirety in the year made. The first case 
explicitly s uggesting such an approach is Cincinnati 
N.O. & Tex Pac. RR v. United States.92 The taxpayer 
operated a railroad supervised by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC), which required that financial 
statements be prepared according to its "General In-
structions of Accounting Classifications." From 
January I, 1921, to January 31, 1940, they provided a 
"minimum rule" that railroads account for purchases 
of property (other than track) of less than $100 by 
charging them to operating expenses rather than to a 
capital account. In 1940, the ICC raised the minimum 
rule ceiling from $100 to $500. The government as-
serted that since the items accounted for by the mini-
mum rule admittedly had a useful life longer than one 
year, they necessarily constituted permanent improve-
ments or betterments, and, therefore, must be capital-
8766 T.e. 515 (1976), aII'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 422 U.s. 941 (1979). 
88424 F.2d 536 (Ct. Cl. 1970). 
89582 F.2d 604 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
90685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982). 
91245 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957) (current deduction of regularly 
prepa id multiyear business insurance did not distort income). 
92424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970); see generally Gunn, supra. This 
decision was foreshadowed by the Eighth Circuit, in 
Waldheim Realty & lnvf'stment Co. v. Comm'r, 245 F.2d 823, 827 
(8th Cir. 1957), which similarly determined that there was no 
distortion of income for purposes of the predecessor to sec-
tion 446(b) where the taxpayer regularly deducted prepaid 
premiums on multiyear insurance policies because "it is ex-
tremely doubtful whether any substantial difference would 
result over a period of years." 
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ized ipso facto without consideration of any other fac-
tors . The Court of Claims noted that this position 
would require that the method-of-accounting sections 
of section 446 be subordinated to the capital expendi-
ture and depreciation sections of the code.93 To the 
contrary, the court held that the capitalization, 
depreciation, and method-of-accounting provisions are 
"inextricably intertwined" and must be utilized in con-
junction in deciding the ultimate issue of the success 
of the taxpayer's method in clearly reflecting income. 
I 
Where the burden on both taxpayers and Ser-
vice to account for each item of property separately 
is great, and the likelihood of dis tortion of income 
is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and so 
impracticable that it demands that nevertheless 
all items be accounted for individually, no matter 
what the trouble or the onus .... 
The burden on plaintiff, if the minimum rule 
is not to be followed for income tax purposes, 
would be heavy; at the same time, the clearer 
reflection of income would be exceedingly slight 
if there were any at all.94 
The critical question is whether current 
deduction of an expenditure benefitting 
future years will result in more than 
minimal distortion of income. 
Subsequently, th e Court of Claims in Southland 
Royalty Co. v. United States,95 again focused on the 
amount of distortion and hardship to the taxpayer as 
well as the inappropriateness of amortization as critical 
to current deductibility of recurring short-lived oil and 
gas survey costs.96 
Decisive for the deductibility of the expenses 
incurred for the Gillespie report is that they are 
functionally part of, and indistinguishable from, 
expenditures for ordinary management plan-
ning ... . Here the Government does not argue that 
there is some underlying tangible or intangible 
asset to which the survey costs may properly be 
added .... Neither is amortization appropriate. The 
useful life of the survey is very uncertain[ ... . I]t is 
not compulsory to amortize such a recurring item 
over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it appropriate 
to require capitalization without amortization; such 
a requirement would dearly distort Southland's in-
come .. .. [T}he fact that expenditures provide 
benefits more than one year into the future is 
merely a factor for consideration and "does not 
mean that, by a Pavlovian reflex, they must al-
ways be non-deductible .... " 97 
93Sec tions 263 and 167. 
94424 F.2d at 572. 
95582 F.2d 604, 616 (Ct. CI. 1978). 
96A student once informed me that oil and gas surveys are 
recurring because other drilling and pumping in the area and 
movement of underground water changes the underground 
reserves. 
97882 F.2d at 616-18 (footnote omitted). 
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Such minimal distortion is produced by the current 
deduction of an expenditure with future benefits where 
the expenditure: (1) is not substantial in relationship 
to the taxpayer's overall income for the year or its 
useful life is short (as illustrated by Cinn. N.O. and 
Southlalld Royalty above); (2) recurs regularly or an-
nually in roughly equivalent amounts (as illustrated in 
Encyclopedia Britannica98 ); or perhaps (3) cannot be 
98We can think of a practical reason for allowing 
authors to deduct their expenses immediately, one ap-
plicable as well to publishers though not in the cir-
cumstances of the present case. If you are in the business 
of producing a series of assets that will yield income over 
a period of years - which is the situation of most 
authors and all publishers - identifying particular ex-
penditures with particular books, a necessary step for 
proper capitalization because the useful lives of the 
books will not be the same, may be very difficult, since 
the expenditures of an author or publishers (more clearly 
the latter) tend to be joint among several books. Moreover, 
allocating these expenditures among the different books 
is not always necessary to produce the temporal matching 
of income and expenditures that the Code disiderates, 
because the taxable income of the author or publisher who 
is in a steady state (that is, whose output is neither increas-
ing nor decreasing) will be a t least approximately the same 
whether his costs are expensed or capitalized. Not the 
same in any given book - on each book expenses and 
receipts will be systematically mismatched - but the same 
on average. Under these conditions the benefits of 
capitalization are unlikely to exceed the accounting and 
oth~r. a.d,?1.inistrative costs entailed in capitalization. 
There is another point to be noted about the distinc-
tion between recurring and nonrecurring expenses and 
its bearing on the issue in this case. If one really takes 
seriously the concept of a capital expenditure as any-
thing that yields income, actual or imputed, beyond the 
period (conventionally one year, United States v. Wehrli, 
400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968)) in which the expendi-
ture is made, the result will be to force the capitalization 
of virtually every business expense. It is a result courts 
naturally shy away from . See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp. 
v. Commissioner of InternaJ Revenue, 475 F.2d 775,785 (2d 
Cir. 1973) . It would require capitalizing every salesman's 
salary, since his selling activities create goodwill for the 
company and goodwill is an asset yielding income 
beyond the year in which the salary expense is incurred. 
The administrative costs of conceptual rigor are too 
great. The distinction between recurring and nonrecur-
ring business expenses provides a very crude but per-
haps serviceable demarcation between those capital 
expenditures that can feaSibly be capitalized and those 
that cannot be. Whether the distinction breaks down 
where, as in the case of the conventional publisher, the 
firm's entire business is the production of capital assets, 
so that it is literally true that all of its business expenses 
are capital in nature, is happily not a question we have 
to decide here, for it is clear that Encyclopedia 
Britannica's payments to David-Stewart were of a non-
normal, nonrecurrent nature. 
Encyclopedia Brita/1I1ica, 685 F.2d at 213-17 (Judge Posner). 
The recurring/nonrecurring and "steady state" concepts un-
derlay the bank credit card cases and Briarcliff Candy as well 
as Southland Royalty. See Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. at 18-20. 
Implicitly WaJdheim Realty rested in part on this notion. 
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clearly associated with either current or future tax 
years.99 
Judge Posner noted an apparent tension between the 
current deduction of recurring, steady state expendi-
tures and Idaho Power's mandate of capitalization of 
costs identified with the acquisition of specific capital 
assets. Reconciliation of the two lies in the "separa te 
basket" approach to purchase price allocations. The 
acquisition cost doctrine is compatible with the timing-
minimum-distortion-of-income principle only so long 
as the expenditure made in connection with the ac-
quisition of a capital asset does not produce benefits 
for a shorter period than the asset to whose basis it is 
added. If, however, the expenditure's benefits last for 
a shorter period than the useful life of the capital asset 
acquired, capitalization of the expenditure and its ad-
dition to the basis of the asset acquired itself produces 
distortion of income through depreciation or amortiza-
tion over a longer period than that benefitted by the 
expenditure, or at worst, by no amortization at all. The 
solution to the potential conflict between current de-
ductibility of recurring steady state expenditures and 
the acquisition cost doctrine lies in which "asset" is 
acquired. For in addition to the "origin-of-the-c1aim" 
doctrine, avoiding such distortion of income also re-
quires the use of a judicially approved accounting con-
cept: treatment of the expenditure itself as a separate, 
freestanding asset, a "deferred charge" in financial or 
"book" accounting terms,100 and then amortization of 
its cost over the period benefitted, as the Tax Court 
innovatively did in Wolfson Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Comm'r. 101 
What Judge Posner overlooked in Encyclopedia 
Britannica is that in acquiring a capital asset consisting 
of a mass of assets, the purcl1ase price is allocated 
separately to each asset or class of assets. This principle 
is seen in the purchase of a business, now governed by 
section 1060, and in the purchase of a depreciable asset 
such as a building in the optional pre-ACRS com-
ponent depreCiation. Of course, in Idaho Power, the 
benefit from transporting the construction workers ex-
tended over the life of the structure they built so that 
99[T)here is a residuum of current expenditures which 
will have some future benefit but which "cannot, as a 
practical matter, be associated with any other period" 
and allocation of which "ei ther on the basis of associa-
tion with revenue or among several accounting periods 
is considered to serve no useful purpose. These also 
are currently deductible. An example might be the 
salary of a high corporate officer whose time is not 
practically allocable between present operations and 
future projects. 
NCNB (/), 651 F.2d at 961-62 (footnotes omitted and 
second quote not closed in original) . 
looFor a detailed discussion of these financial accounting 
terms in the context of amortization of business expansion 
costs as a freestanding asset see NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 948-50. 
10172 T.c. 1, 11-13 (1979){treatment of decennial dredging 
of irrigation ditches with 50-year life as "a free-standing in-
tangible asset with an amortizable 10-year life. "). Professor 
Gunn had a lso suggested thi s solution to intractable 
capitalization problems. Gunn, supra at 445-46; accord Lee, 
supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. 30-41. 
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the depreciation had to be added to the structure itself. 
(And the same was true on the facts of the particular 
nonrecurring expenditures in Encyclopedia Britannica, 
as Judge Posner noted.) But where the intangible, such 
as training the initial work force or start-up advertising, 
provides benefits for a shorter period than the broader 
capital asset of the business or permit, it should be set up 
as a freestanding amortizable asset - a deferred charge. 
If the period benefitted is short or highly variable, so that 
amortization over a period ot years is difficult or impos-
sible, and the expenditure is at least "steady-state" recur-
ring, then the cost treated as a separate asset should be 
ded ucted in its entirety in the year made.102 The Tax Court 
obliquely approved this latter notion in its approval of 
the result, but not the reasoning, of a start-up decision 
approving the deduction in the year made of recurring, 
operating expenses such as wages, utilities, and adver-
tis ing incurred in the same year that a nursing home 
received its license and commenced operations but 
before such receipt. "We think the expenses in Manor 
Care were clearly pre-operating in nature [and, hence, 
not deductible under section 162]. However, to the ex-
tent the expenditures created assets with determinable 
useful lives benefiting taxable years following the start 
of business operations, such amounts would be deduct-
ible during those taxable years in the form of amortiza-
tion deductions irrespective of when they were 
paid ."lo3 Deduction of the start-up costs in their en-
tirety in year one104 thus rested on treatment of the 
expenditures as freestanding intangibles, rather than 
being added to the basis of the business as a whole or 
to the permit and on the reasonable amount of 
depreciation being the entire expenditure because it 
did not provide benefits beyond the year made. Query 
whether the latter was true as to the advertising. The 
better basis there of current deduction is the recurring, 
steady-state concept. 
A panel of the Fourth Circuit in NCNB Corp. v. Ullited 
States 105 considered the deductibility of expansion costs 
of an existing banking business, which were analogous 
to start-up costs of a new business. These costs were 
incurred in selecting an area of the state for expansion, 
planning future branches in that area, turning such 
general plans into concrete courses of action, obtaining 
the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, and 
involved internal (e.g., salaries, depreciation, and 
amortization) and external (e.g., fees paid to the Comp-
troller, attorney's fees, amounts paid to outside con-
sultants for marketing studies) costs. The taxpayer ar-
gued that, because expenditures did not create a 
separate capital asset or a property interest and because 
102S oll thland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 617 
(Ct. Cl. 19780; Iowa-Des Moines Nat'[ Bank v. Comm'r, 592 F.2d 
433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979); Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc . v. Comm'r, 
685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982). 
103Goodwin v. Comlll'r, 75 T.e. 424, 433-34 n.9 (1980), affd 
mem., 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982). 
104 OW that section 195 is preemptive, this result is no. 
longer permitted. 
105651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981) ("NCNB /,,), vacated, 684 F.2d 
285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("NCNB 1I"). 
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they were involved in expanding an old business, they 
were currently deductible under authorities such as 
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r,t 06 and the bank credit 
card cases, such as Colorado Springs National Bank v. United 
States. 107 The taxpayer argued that, therefore, the only 
possible grounds for capitalizing the expenditures would 
be a rule requiring capitalizatio.n of all expenditures that 
pro.duce for the enterprise a future benefit, which, it ar-
gued, was rejected in Lincoln Savings.lOB 
Where an intangible provides benefits 
for a shorter period than the broader 
capital asset of the business or 
permit, it should be set up as a 
freestanding amortizable asset. 
NCNB I rejected Briarcliff Candy and its bank credit 
card progeny and did not read Lincoln Savings as re-
quiring capitalization only where there is a separate 
asset. Nor did the panel take the position that all ex-
penditures benefitting future years must be capital-
ized. Rather, it held that where a current deduction of 
expenditures would distort inco.me, as would generally 
be the case where expenditures benefit present and 
future years (the panel overly hastily catego.rized 
various exceptions as rules of convenience), the expen-
diture must be capitalized. Otherwise, clear reflection 
of income would not result. Such capitalization was in 
the eyes of the panel "compelled by the statutory re-
quirement of a method of accounting which will'clear-
ly reflect income' by recognizing in the same tax year 
both growth revenues and the cost of producing those 
revenues."109 Probably, the most innovative holding of 
the NCNB I panel opinion was to reject the all-or-noth-
ing appro.ach of the prior case law (current deduction 
or capitalization without amortization) and allow a 
partial current deduction plus a deduction over future 
years, i.e., amortization, to the extent that the taxpayer 
could show that the expenditures were properly allo.-
cable to the present and future years. lIO Prior cases, 
106475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). 
107505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974). 
108403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971). 
109651 F.2d 961. The panel overly relied Dn generally ac-
cepted accounting principles as providing an answer here. 
NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 948, 952-53. 
11 0651 F.2d at 962-63. Judge Murhagan, authDr of the panel 
decision, dissented to. the en banc decisio.n. 
To. sum it all up, we have here a case where an 
oppDrtunity to resort to. the go.lden mean is ignDred~ 
Start-up expenditures, and Dther expenditures like 
start-up expenditures except that they co.ncern existing 
businesses, o.ften have multi-year lives or applications. 
In such cases they shDuld not be immediately fully 
deductible in the year paid or incurred as ordinary and 
necessary expenses. Rather they should be capitalized 
and prorated. That is to. say that they should, o.ver time, 
be deductible for inCDme tax purposes, but not all at 
once, in one fell swoop. 
684 F.2d at 295-96. 
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where capitalizing analogous start-up costs, had al-
lowed no deduction, only a basis increase which could 
not be recovered by depreciation since the business 
generally had no definitely determinable life. 
The most innovative holding of the 
HeNB I panel was to reject the 
all-or-nothing approach of the prior 
case law and allow a partial current 
deduction plus a deduction over 
future years. 
The panel decision in NCNB 1 would have allowed a 
Cohan-type approximation to match revenue and expen-
ses. "If the [lower) court finds the taxpayer did make 
some use of the Metro Studies in its current-revenue-
producing operations, then even if no better than a rough 
guess is possible, some allocation should be made, and 
the resulting faction of the amortization allowance may 
be taken as a current deduction."lIl The clear reflection 
of income approach adopted by the panel in NCNB had 
been called for by commentators. lI2 The assumption of 
the panel that revenues could be traced to particular 
expenditures, however, is extremely questionable. 
Moreover, the Cohan rule of approximation technically 
appears to be unavailable in refund suits where the tax-
payer must prove the correct amount of tax payable to 
prevail. ll3 Ironically, NCNB I was a refund suit. Commen-
tators were quick to point out that the NCNB I panel 
approach would render section 195 unavailable as to 
start-up expenditures, as well as investigatory costs, due 
to the section's incorporation of deductibility by an ex-
isting business as a standard for amortization.114 Now 
they make the same complaint as to INDOPCO.ll5 
111651 F.2d at 962. 
l12See Note, "Deductibility of Start-Up Expenditures 
Under Section 162 - The 'Clear-Reflection-of-lncome' Test," 
61 Cornell L. Rev. 618 (1976). 
Il3See Lee, "Section 482 and the Integrated Business 
Enterprise," 57 Va. L. Rev. 1376, 1400 at n.129 (1971). For a 
discussion of more traditional use of Cohan to approximate 
useful life for amortization purposes see Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax 
L. Rev. at 38-41. 
114See Shapiro & Shaw, "Start-Up Expenditures - Section 
195: Clarification or More Confusion?," 34 So. Cal. Tax Inst. 
11-1,11-20 (1982); Warner, "Deductibility of Business Expan-
sion Expenses - NCNB Corp. v. U.S .," TMM 81-22 (1981). 
llSSee Javaras and Todd, "Business Expansion and Protec-
tion in the Post-INDOPCO World," 55 Tax Notes 971, 975 (May 
18, 1992) (grasping at straws, authors argue that this result 
should be avoided through doctrine of legislative reenact-
ment); Note, "Deductibility of Takeover and Non-Takeover 
Expenses in the Wake of INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner," 35 
Tax Law. 815,823 (1992) . As the ultimate source of the incor-
poration in section 195'5 legislative history of the separate 
asset doctrine, I would like to point out that the issue of the 
continued viability of section 195 merits a more thorough and 
hopefully more balanced treatment than the above. Compare 
Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. at 71-6, 86-91. And vitiating section 
195 would not leave a black hole without amortization into 
which business expansion costs would fall. 
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The Fourth Circuit en bane reversed the panel 
decision on the basis that no separate saleable asset 
was created and overruled the future benefits leg of 
Richmond Television, the earlier Fourth Circuit prece-
dent establishing the start-up doctrine. The Supreme 
Court in INDOPCO in turn saw NCNB (en bane) as 
conflicting with the Third Circuit opinion in National 
Starch, which it affirmed. Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court also pointed to Central Texas Savings and Loan as 
"inquiring whether establishment of new branches 
'creates a separate and distinct asset' so that capitaliza-
tion is the proper tax treatment."116 Almost 20 years 
ago, Professor Gunn pointed out that a fundamental 
error in the cases was increasing the basis of the wrong 
asset, generally nondepreciable such as the business or 
an indefinite permit, rather than treating an expendi-
ture creating future benefits of a finite duration as the 
asset itself, i.e., an amortizable, freestanding deferred 
charge. It is to be hoped that we will not have to go 
through another round of increasing the wrong basis 
with resultant distortion of income . The courts' 
flexibility in avoiding distortion of income as business 
expansion costs should lie in (a) approximating or es-
timating useful lives of the costs as freestanding intan-
gibles under Cohan v. Comm'r,1I7 or (b) determining that 
a current deduction produces minimal distortion of 
income.118 
The en bane opinion in NCNB 1J may be reconcilable 
with a distortion-of-income approach since it found the 
expenditures in effect to be recurring. Regularly recur-
ring expenditures, provided that they are not substan-
tially greater in one year than in another, do not present 
a distortion-of-income problem when they are 
116112 S. Ct. at 1042 n.3. 
11739 f,2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). 
1I81n Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States, 505 
F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974), the court relied heavily on 
Briarcliff Candy and allowed a current deduction under 
section 162(a) for all of a taxpayer 's preoperational 
expenditures in connection with beginning participa-
tion in a national credit card system. Although the 
expenditures were of a sort which would frequently 
recur (thus suggesting that any benefits obtained had 
a determinable useful life) and although the taxpayer 
had recognized some revenues from the credit card 
program during the tax year in question, the Commis-
sioner suggested to the court no way in which the 
expenditures might be amortized, and thus deductible 
partially in that tax year, nor, indeed, did he suggest 
that they might ever be deductible. ld. at 1192. Reject-
ing a scheme under which "an expenditure, concededly 
of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amor-
tized," the court allowed the current-expense deduc-
tion. [d. (emphasis added) .. .. 
In conection with multi-year intangible benefits, 
however, the Commissioner generally allows amortiza-
tion to begin once the remaining useful life of the asset 
in question can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. 
See Treas. Reg. section 1.167(a)-3. The taxpayer in the 
instant case is, therefore, not faced with the Ca tch-22 
from which the Tenth Circuit believed that it had to 
rescue Colorado Springs National Bank. 
NCNB Bank (I), 651 F.2d 959-60. 
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deducted currentl y even though they benefi t present 
and future years. This approach also would reconcile 
current deductibility of advertising expenses, which 
generally benefit present and future years, with the 
distortion-of-income approach. 
Regularly recurring expenditures, 
provided that they are not 
substantially greater in one year than 
in another, do not present a 
distortion-ot-income problem when 
they are deducted currently_ 
umrnarizing, the freestanding asset model entails 
a two-step analysis: (1) look a t whether current deduc-
tion of an expenditure will distort the taxpayer's in-
come (because the expenditure provides future benefits 
and is neither sufficiently insubstantial nor recurring 
to be nondistorting if currently deducted); if so, (2) 
estimate the period benefitted by the expenditure, i.e., 
the useful life, and amortize the expenditure as a free-
standing asset over that period.1l9 
Admittedly, thi s model ignores "time-value of 
money" notions.J20 The proposal was originally 
directed to the courts, which decline to adopt such 
notions as a common-law doctrine.l2l Congress is the 
better target for such pleas and it is inclined to leave 
self-created intangibles of a going concern alone as 
evidenced by sections 195 and 263A and proposed sec-
tion 197. This article is primarily directed to Treasury 
and the IRS, and they will be well-advised to ignore 
time-value considerations as well in accordance with 
their stated goals of making "do with 'rough justice' 
and accept[ing] that life is messy rather than be[ing] 
motivated by a quest for theoretica l purity. General 
principles are often better than detailed rules."122 
V. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Employee Training Expenses 
Where employee training expenses are regularly 
recu rring in roughly the same amount either as retrain-
ing or replacement training, the expenditures should 
be currently deductible. Fluctuations of up to 20 per-
cent123 from the average should also be currently de-
ductible. In the case of initial employee training in a 
different business before the active business commences 
or if after but greatly exceed ing average retraining and 
replacement training costs, five-year amortization 
1I9See Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. 12-15. 
120Johnson, "Soft Money Investing Under the Income 
Tax," 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1019,1072-77,1086-89. 
I21See, e.g., Follander v. Comm'r, 89 T.e. 943 (1987); Coven, 
"Redefining Debt; Of Indianapolis Power and Fictitious Inter-
est," 10 Va. Tax Rev. 587, 589-90 (1991). 
122"1992 Business Plan," elect ronically reproduced 92 Tax 
Notes Today 104-50. 
12.1This percentage was chosen on the basis of the five-year 
amortization model discussed below. 
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should be permitted either under section 195 or by 
analogy. 124 (Of course, section 195 no longer works as 
a matter of theory after the overturning of the separate 
asset doctrine,125 but Treasury and the Service should 
positively state that they will permit section 195 elec-
tions as to recurring, short-lived, or insubstantial start-
up expenditures and perhaps even investigatory costs 
incurred prior to commencement of the different active 
business.) Similar five-year amortization should be al-
lowed for initial training expenses substantially above 
the average retraining, etc., costs in expanding the 
same business. Given that most taxpayers are surely 
currently deducting such expenses, even if erroneous-
ly, revenue neutrality should not demand that the 
proposed section 197 amortization period be used. 
B. Advertising 
As a conceptual matter, deduction of general good-
will advertising, even of specific goods or services, 
should be treated much the same as employee training 
costs with a focus on recurrence and steady state. 
Politically, however, limitation of current deductibility 
of most advertising costs is contraindicated by Ways 
and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski's, O-III., 
specific exclusion of advertising costs from the pur-
view of proposed section 197.126 Therefore, it might be 
advisable to allow current deduction of advertising 
expenses that substantially exceed the average level or 
the level in succeeding years. This is the approach im-
plicitly taken in Rev. Rul. 92-80, which simply states 
that advertising costs are "generally deductible" under 
section 162 "even though advertising may have some 
future effect on business activities, as in the case of 
institutional or goodwill advertising." 
Where advertising primarily is to help acquire a 
specific capital asset and its benefits will be coter-
minous with the life of such asset, it should be treated 
as an acquisition added to such asset. The key issue is 
whether the advertising benefits are coterminous. Un-
fortunately, Rev. Rul. 92-80 may obscure analysis of this 
problem. It stated the issue as whether the advertising 
"is directed towards obtaining future benefits sig-
nificantly beyond those traditionally associated with 
ordinary product advertising or with institutional or 
l24It is likely not administratively feasible to determine on 
a case-by-case basis the actual retraining and replacement 
training rates and the actual useful life of the training costs at 
least for smaller businesses. Where it probably is feasible, say, 
at the $100 million or more level in corporate assets, requiring 
actual establishment of useful lives is not objectionable. Those 
10,000 corporations report almost 80 percent of the corporate 
sector revenues and most are in continual audit. This level 
could even be raised to the 5,000 corporations with $250 mil-
lion or more in assets which report almost 75 percent of the 
corporate sector income. 
125Src note 114, supra. 
J26"Unofficial TranSCript of October 2 Ways and Means 
Committee Hearing on Amortization of Intangibles," 91 Tax 
Notes Today 208-26 ("Some persons have questioned whether 
this bill was intended to open the door for reconsidering tax 
deductions for advertising expenses. Let me be clear. The 
answer is, no.") (Statement of Chairman Rostenkowski). 
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goodwill advertising," in which case the costs of such 
advertising must be capi talized. The ruling accurately 
described the advertising costs in Cleveland Electric l 27 
as "incurred to allay public opposition to the granting 
of a license to construct a nuclear power plant." But 
the policy-based reason that the advertising costs 
should be capitalized and added to the basis of the 
permit is that they were not recurring, were substan-
tial, and, because their benefit can not be separated 
from the permit itself, constituted an acquisition cost 
of the permit. 
C. Repairs 
Deductibility of repairs has been the mos t frequently 
litigated of these mixed present-future benefit areas, 
but the case law has evolved less here than in the other 
areas. Here, Treasury fiRS could provide the most help 
by establishing safe harbors for repairs. The most use-
ful would be one based on a percentage of depreciation 
allowance similar to the "repair allowance" under the 
old Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system.128 There, 
the safe harbor went as high as 15 percent for trucks, 
but most seemed to cluster around 10 percent, with 
much lower percentages for heavy manufacturing 
equipment and especially for buildings. Here, too, a 
distinction between big and little taxpayers might be 
useful. Also, temporary 1992 standards might be ad-
visable, with more detailed and accurate categories 
later based on actual historical experience of classes of 
taxpayers. 
127C1eueland Elec/ric, 7 Cl. Ct. 230-32. 
128See Withdrawn Treas. Reg. section 1.167-11(d)(2) and 
Rev. Proc. 72-10, 1972-1 C.B. 721. 
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